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spite the questionable result reached, the decision in Blum may
have the salutory effect of focusing legislative attention upon this
area. As a consequence, it is hoped legislative action significantly
reducing the statute of limitations for actions in contribution will
be forthcoming.
ARTICLE

41

-

TRIAL BY A JURY

CPLR 4102(a): Party requesting nonjury trial may not later object
to withdrawal of another party's demand for jury trial.
CPLR 4102(a) requires a party who desires a jury trial to include a demand in a note of issue served on all parties and filed with
the court.' Failure to include the demand is deemed a waiver of the
right to a jury trial."" To withdraw a demand under 4102(a), a party
must obtain the consent of the other parties to the action.", Recently, in Gonzalez v. Concourse Plaza Syndicates, Inc., "I the Court
of Appeals, in a per curiam opinion, held that a party who indicates
his preference for a nonjury trial in a note of issue thereby consents
3
to any subsequent withdrawal of demand for a jury trial."
The Gonzalez plaintiff commenced a wrongful death action
after her husband fell from a window he was washing at the Concourse Plaza Hotel, naming the hotel and the Weinbergs, occupants
of the apartment whose windows the decedent was washing, as defendants. Plaintiff filed a note of issue requesting a trial without a
accrue at the time the tortfeasor is served with process and is able to obtain jurisdiction over
the third-parties. Id. at 230-32.
"' CPLR 4102(a) provides in pertinent part:
Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue of fact triable of right by a jury,
by serving upon all other parties and filing a note of issue containing a demand for
trial by jury. Any party served with a note of issue not containing such a demand
may demand a trial by jury by serving upon each party a demand for a trial by
jury and filing such demand . . . within fifteen days after service of the note of
issue.
For a general discussion of CPLR 4102, see 4 WK&M
4102.01-.22.
11" CPLR 4102(a). Although the right to trial by jury is protected by the state constitution, "a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner to be prescribed
by law." N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 2. The Court of Appeals has held that the right to a jury trial
must be timely asserted. See Brenner v. Great Cove Realty Co., 6 N.Y.2d 435, 442, 160 N.E.2d
826, 829, 190 N.Y.S.2d 337, 342 (1959). See generally Craig v. City of New York, 228 App.
Div. 275, 239 N.Y.S. 328 (1st Dep't 1930); 4 WK&M T 4102.10.
" CPLR 4102(a). See Russell v. Russell, 40 App. Div. 2d 945, 339 N.Y.S.2d 319 (4th
Dep't 1972) (mem.); Schrank v. Rensselaer Assocs., 65 Misc. 2d 428, 317 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Sup.
Ct. Rensselaer County 1970) (mem.).
12 41 N.Y.2d 414, 361 N.E.2d 1011, 393 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1977) (per curiam), aff'g 51 App.
Div. 2d 42, 378 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1st Dep't 1976).
1" 41 N.Y.2d at 416, 361 N.E.2d at 1013, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
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jury, but due to a demand by the Weinbergs a jury trial was held.
After three jury trials a verdict was rendered in favor of defendants
Weinberg and against defendant Concourse Plaza."4 Subsequently,
the appellate division set aside the verdict against Concourse," 5 and
the Flatiron Window Cleaning Company, decedent's employer, was
impleaded upon remand." 6 As the jury for the fourth trial was about
to be selected, the defendants joined in a motion to transfer the
action to the nonjury calendar." 7 The trial court granted the motion
and denied plaintiffs application to file a demand for a jury trial
nunc pro tunc. A divided appellate division affirmed."'
The Court of Appeals, in reaching its conclusion to uphold the
lower court's decision,"' endorsed an interpretation of CPLR 4102
previously employed by the Appellate Division, First Department,
in Downing v. Downing. I The Downing court had reasoned that the
clause in 4102(a) conditioning the right to withdraw a demand upon
the consent of all the parties was designed to "protect the party who
in reliance on his opponent's demand for a jury trial properly fails
to make demand in his own note of issue."' 2 ' Noting that the plaintiff in Gonzalez had specifically expressed a preference for a nonjury
trial,, the Gonzalez Court ruled that she was without need of this
statutory protection. Her request for trial without a jury was
'" Id. at 416, 361 N.E.2d at 1012, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 363. The first trial was declared a
mistrial. Id. at 415, 361 N.E.2d at 1012, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 363. At the second trial, plaintiff's
cause of action was dismissed at the close of her case in chief, but the first department
reversed. 31 App. Div. 2d 401, 298 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1st Dep't 1969).
"1 41 N.Y.2d at 416, 361 N.E.2d at 1012, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 363. Since the Weinbergs'
verdict was undisturbed, they were dismissed from the case. 37 App. Div. 2d 822, 324
N.Y.S.2d 962 (1st Dep't 1971) (mem.).
"I Decedent's employer was impleaded for contribution pursuant to the decision in Dole
v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
117 41 N.Y.2d at 416, 361 N.E.2d at 1012, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
"1 51 App. Div. 2d at 43, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 718. Under CPLR 3402(b), a new party brought
into an action must be served with the note of issue already filed. The new party may then
demand a jury trial by following the procedures outlined in CPLR 4102. Flatiron did not,
however, demand trial by jury. Since neither Concourse Plaza nor Flatiron had requested a
jury trial, and the Weinbergs were no longer parties to the litigation, the first department
considered the situation similar to one in which no party had ever demanded a jury trial. 51
App. Div. 2d at 43, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
"1 41 N.Y.2d at 417, 361 N.E.2d at 1013, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
a 32 App. Div. 2d 350, 302 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1st Dep't 1969). The facts in Downing were
quite similar to those in Gonzalez. The Downing plaintiff had waived a jury trial by failing
to include a demand in his note of issue, but defendant did make such a demand. Before trial,
defendant moved to strike his demand for a jury and plaintiff objected, insisting that his
consent was required under CPLR 4102(a). The court found plaintiff's consent unnecessary.
Id. at 351, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
121Id.
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deemed advance consent to any withdrawal or waiver of a demand
for jury trial.1 22 Judge Fuchsberg, who authored a dissenting opinion, 23 contended that CPLR 4102(a) clearly requires the consent of
all parties for the withdrawal or waiver of a demand. 4 Pointing to
the state constitution's guarantee of the right to a jury trial, the
Judge reasoned that provisions for waiver of that right should be
strictly construed.' 2 Thus, Judge Fuchsberg concluded that plain26
tiff may invoke the protection of 4102(a).
The Gonzalez majority appears to have reached the proper conclusion. 27 A plaintiff who has waived a jury trial either by failing to
file a demand or by indicating a preference for a nonjury trial,
absent reliance on another party's demand, should not later be permitted to fall back on CPLR 4102(a) .125 Indeed, it is difficult to
conceive of a situation in which the Gonzalez result would work an
injustice.1 29 The lower courts have been applying this rationale with
apparently satisfactory results.3 0 If a situation should arise where a
party is aggrieved by the withdrawal of a demand, however, the
court may grant leave to request a jury trial nunc pro tunc by virtue
31
of the discretionary powers bestowed by CPLR 4102(e).

41 N.Y.2d at 416, 361 N.E.2d at 1012-13, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
Judge Cooke filed a separate dissenting opinion. 41 N.Y.2d at 418, 361 N.E.2d at 1014,
393 N.Y.S.2d at 364 (Cooke, J., dissenting). Although he agreed with the majority's construction of 4102(a), Judge Cooke voted to reverse and remand the case for a determination
whether relief should be granted under CPLR 4102(e). Id. See note 131 infra.
124 41 N.Y.2d at 417, 361 N.E.2d at 1013, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 364 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 418, 361 N.E.2d at 1013, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 364 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). Judge
Fuchsberg's position on the importance of the right to trial by jury and the concomitant
necessity to strictly construe statutes limiting that right appears to command wide support.
See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). See also Aetna Ins. Co. v.
Kennedy ex rel. Bogash, 301 U.S. 389 (1937); McNulty v. Mount Morris Elec. Light Co., 172
N.Y. 410, 65 N.E. 196 (1902).
21 41 N.Y.2d at 418, 361 N.E.2d at 1013, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 364 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
121It should be noted that Professor David Siegel has indicated that "[tihe legislative
view, insofar as any can be discerned, would apparently" not support the Gonzalez result.
CPLR 4102, commentary at 54 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977). He also has stated, however,
that the "result is not inherently an unjust one." Id.
21 See Downing v. Downing, 32 App. Div. 2d 350, 302 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1st Dep't 1969).
12g See note 127 supra.
' ° See, e.g., Schrank v. Rensselaer Assocs., Inc., 65 Misc. 2d 428, 317 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Sup.
Ct. Rensselaer County 1970) (mem.); Halpert v. Ingram & Greene, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 872, 333
N.Y.S.2d 913 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1972). See also Jefferson Pulp & Paper, Inc. v.
Arrington, 76 Misc. 2d 794, 352 N.Y.S.2d 127 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1974).
"I1Under CPLR 4102(e), "[tlhe court may relieve a party from the effect of failing to
comply with [4102(a)] if no undue prejudice to the rights of another party would result."
Id. The plaintiff in Gonzalez had applied for relief under this section, but the trial court
summarily denied the motion. 41 N.Y.2d at 415, 361 N.E.2d at 1012, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 362. It
is submitted that the lower court properly denied relief. Section 4102(e) has uniformly been
122
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Nonetheless, the Gonzalez Court may have overlooked an argument supportive of the plaintiff's position. A line of pre-CPLR authority holds that the right to demand a jury revives upon the granting of a new trial. 32 Under this view, plaintiff's expressed preference
for a trial without a jury would apparently not be binding at a
retrial. 33 If so, plaintiff arguably was entitled to the protection of
CPLR 4102(a), since, in failing to demand a jury for the second and
construed as allowing a court to favorably consider such a motion only when a party has failed
to demand a jury through excusable mistake or inadvertance. See, e.g., International Mining
Corp. v. Aerovias Nacionales De Colombia, 49 App. Div. 2d 855, 374 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1st Dep't
1975) (mem.); Heller v. Hacken, 40 App. Div. 2d 1012, 338 N.Y.S.2d 943 (2d Dep't 1972)
(mem.); Zelvin v. Pagliocca, 32 App. Div. 2d 561, 300 N.Y.S.2d 361 (2d Dep't 1969); Eastern
Air Lines, Inc. v. Town of Islip, 14 App. Div 2d 792, 220 N.Y.S.2d 461 (2d Dep't 1961) (mem.);
Schwartz v. Sunlight Apts., Inc., 274 App. Div. 901, 83 N.Y.S.2d 80 (2d Dep't 1948) (mem.).
Since the Gonzalez plaintiff waived her right by making a specific request for a nonjury trial,
41 N.Y.2d at 415, 361 N.E.2d at 1012, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 362-63, her situation does not appear
to satisfy either of these criteria. See generally 4 WK&M 4102.17.
"I A substantial number of cases appear to hold that the right to demand a jury revives
upon retrial. See, e.g., Midtown Contracting Co. v. Goldsticker, 169 App. Div. 21, 154 N.Y.S.
451 (1st Dep't 1915) (per curiam); Asbestolith Mfg. Co. v. Rowland, 143 App. Div. 418, 128
N.Y.S. 173 (1st Dep't 1911); Manheim v. Seitz, 36 App. Div. 352, 55 N.Y.S. 321 (2d Dep't
1899); Fuller Coal & Oil Corp. v. Dayton Holding Corp., 9 Misc. 2d 341, 170 N.Y.S.2d 121
(Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1957) (per curiam); Lefkowitz v. Resnick, 196 Misc. 661, 92
N.Y.S.2d 441 (Bronx Mun. Ct. 1949). In one case, the court remarked that this "proposition
is not questioned and appears to be sustained by authority." Asbestolith Mfg. Co. v. Rowland, 143 App. Div. 418, 420, 128 N.Y.S. 173, 174 (1st Dep't 1911) (citations omitted); cf. In
re Will of Allaway, 187 App. Div. 87, 175 N.Y.S. 70 (2d Dep't 1919) (the court has discretion
to grant a jury trial upon retrial). Nevertheless, one commentator has stated that a party who
has waived his right to a jury trial may not reassert this right upon the granting of a new
trial. 4 WK&M 4102.17. This view stems from the Appellate Division, Second Department,
decision in Caldovino v. Scala, 10 App. Div. 2d 853, 199 N.Y.S.2d 63 (2d Dep't 1960) (mem.).
In Caldovino, the court held that "[in the absence of a material change in the issue,
appellant, having waived her right to a jury trial, may not retract that waiver, which remains
operative during the life of the litigation." Id., 199 N.Y.S.2d at 64, (citing Vincent v. Cooperman, 283 App. Div. 812, 128 N.Y.S.2d 634 (2d Dep't 1954) (mem.); Laventhall v. Fireman's
Ins. Co., 266 App. Div. 756, 41 N.Y.S.2d 302 (2d Dep't 1943) (mem.); Tracy v. Falvey, 102
App. Div. 585, 92 N.Y.S. 625 (1st Dep't 1905)). The Laventhall court relied on two Court of
Appeals cases, In re Cooper, 93 N.Y. 507 (1883), and Baird v. Mayor of New York, 74 N.Y.
382 (1878). Unfortunately, this reliance appears to be misplaced. The Cooper case, an eminent domain proceeding, involved neither a jury trial nor a retrial situation. Rather, the
appellant there sought to set aside an appraisal of his land made by a commissioner of
estimate and assessment. In consenting to the appointment of this commissioner, the court
held, appellant had waived certain statutory and constitutional protections. 93 N.Y. at 512.
This waiver precluded a later objection premised upon the waived provisions. Id. In Baird,
the appellant had acquiesced in the referral of his action to a referee. 74 N.Y. at 385. Later
seeking to set aside the order of reference, appellant urged that he had a right to a jury trial.
The Court of Appeals held that the lack of objection to the referral constituted a waiver of
trial by jury. Id. at 385-86. Thus, the Court of Appeals has not yet determined whether a party
has a renewed opportunity to demand a jury upon retrial. The weight of lower court authority
indicates, however, that a demand may be made in such a situation.
I" See note 132 supra.
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subsequent retrials, she may have relied upon the fact that the case
already was on the jury calendar. Because this contention was not
discussed in Gonzalez, it may provide a vehicle for the return of the
issue to the Court of Appeals in the future.
The Gonzalez decision represents Court of Appeals' approval of
a practice already commonly employed in the lower courts.' 3 The
decision highlights the significance of a party's initial determination
whether to demand a jury trial. Practitioners should carefully consider this question, as a failure to demand a jury or a request for a
nonjury trial, in the absence of reliance upon another demand in the
case, will preclude later relief under CPLR 4102(a).
ARTICLE

45

-

EVIDENCE

CPLR 4502(b): Spousal privilege does not extend to conversations
which advance joint criminal activity.
To preserve the confidentiality inherent in a marital relationship, CPLR 4502(b) prohibits the disclosure of "a confidential communication made by one [spouse] to the other during marriage."' 3
Various public policy considerations, however, have prompted the
See notes 120-121 & 130 and accompanying text supra.
CPLR 4502(b). There exists a rebuttable presumption that all communications between husband and wife are confidential and hence privileged. See Poppe v. Poppe, 3 N.Y.2d
312, 317, 144 N.E.2d 72, 75, 165 N.Y.S.2d 99, 103 (1957). The marital privilege applies in both
civil and criminal actions, see, e.g., People v. Daghita, 299 N.Y. 194, 198, 86 N.E.2d 172, 173
(1949); 5 WK&M 1 4502.26; and protects acts as well as words, see People v. Monahan, 21
App. Div. 2d 76, 78, 249 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563-64 (4th Dep't 1974) (per curiam); People v.
Sullivan, 42 Misc. 2d 1014, 249 N.Y.S.2d 589 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1964). The privilege
may be waived, provided that both the husband and wife join in the waiver. People v. Wood,
126 N.Y. 249, 271, 27 N.E. 362, 368 (1891).
At common law a husband or wife was deemed incompetent to testify in any action
involving the other spouse. See, e.g., Wilke v. People, 53 N.Y. 525 (1873). Apparently, this
common law doctrine was related to the concept that the husband and wife are a single
person. The doctrine promoted the social goals of preventing perjury and preserving the
stability and harmony of the family by protecting the confidence of the marriage. See Comment, Questioning the Marital Privilege:A Medieval Philosophy in a Modern World, 7 Cuhl.
L. REv. 307, 308 (1976); 74 DICK. L. REv. 499, 500-01 (1970). Although common law incompetency has been abandoned, most jurisdictions retain a marital privilege. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
tit. 15, § 311 (1958); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.210(1) (Supp. 1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
1605 (1973).
As early as 1929, the justification for the marital privilege was questioned by commentators seeking to free suppressed testimony from what was perceived as the "law of evidence
making a rather ineffectual effort . . . to stem the tide [of the breakup of the family]."
Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Family Relations, 13
MINN. L. REv. 675, 679 (1929). The decrease in marital stability may be attributed to many
social forces, including liberal divorce laws, economic stress, and increased mobility. See
generally Hutchins & Slesinger, supra, at 682-85.
13
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